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THE DEATH PENALTY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
SAMUEL R. GROSS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Let me start a long time ago, in 1972. In June of 1972, the Supreme Court 
decided the case of Furman v. Georgia,1 a huge decision, in which the Court 
held that all existing death penalty laws in the United States at that time were 
unconstitutional, and the Court vacated the death judgments against nearly 700 
people on death rows across the country.  
At the time, I was a second-year law student at the University of California 
at Berkeley. My reaction to Furman was “Huh? Death penalty? Do we have a 
death penalty in California? Am I against it? I think I am, but maybe not. I don’t 
know.”  
I didn’t have a position on the death penalty. I do now, and I should say what 
it is, although I am not here to talk about my views on the death penalty. 
I think capital punishment is a terrible idea. It is a policy that has no 
affirmative value whatsoever in modern states. In particular, it does not deter 
murder or crime in general. It is also extremely expensive. It inflicts huge costs 
and pain on many people, including the surviving victims of capital crimes and 
the family members of those who are killed. The death penalty is arbitrary; we 
do not kill the worst murderers, but those who are most unlucky. We 
discriminate by race in imposing the death penalty. We sentence innocent people 
to death—we know that because many have been exonerated—and there is no 
doubt that we have executed innocent people and will continue to do so. Finally, 
the death penalty embodies a type of vengeful punitive nature that infects the 
 
* Thomas & Mabel Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This article is a 
modified version of the 2017 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture, which I delivered at the Saint 
Louis University School of Law on October 13, 2017. I am very grateful to Dean William P. 
Johnson who invited me to give the lecture, to the other participants in the symposium that 
accompanied the lecture, and to Maureen Hanlon, who did a superb job of organizing the 
symposium and who, with the staff of the Saint Louis University Law Journal, turned the lecture 
into the article that follows. A great deal of what I discuss is based on work I have done with Phoebe 
C. Ellsworth, the Frank Murphy Distinguished University Professor of Law and Psychology at the 
University of Michigan; I am profoundly grateful for our collaboration on these issues and so many 
other things. 
 1. 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
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Executions in the United States, 1930 - 2017
entire criminal justice system and contributes to other terrible problems we live 
with, in particular mass incarceration. 
If you do not agree with all that, I will not try to persuade you. I only mention 
my views so you’ll know that part of the background for what I have to say about 
the death penalty in recent American history. 
I.  WHY DO WE STILL HAVE A DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA? 
Back in 1972, forty-five years ago, I had not given the topic much thought—
which is not surprising. In Figure 1, you see the number of executions in the 
United States from 1930 to 2009. In 1972, we were at the bottom. There had not 
been a single execution in five years. 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Sources: Tracy L. Snell, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Capital Punishment, 2011 – Statistical Tables (2014) https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cp11st.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG59-S2M3]; Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Prisoner 
Statistics Program (2011); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty (2018) 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/93PZ-PLYR]. 
 
Earlier, before the Second World War, executions in the United States were 
reasonably common, reaching a level of 150 to 200 a year for several years. 
After the Second World War, the rate of executions went down and down until 
it reached zero. It seemed like the United States would follow the pattern in 
several other western democracies—Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Spain, France—where, after World War II, the use of the death penalty 
declined, then it fell into disuse, and then was ultimately abolished altogether.  
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Furman looked like it was a step – a big step – along the path to abolition. 
But that did not happen. Starting several years later, executions resumed, and 
eventually got back up to rates we had not seen since the 1950s. Why was the 
American path so different?  
There are two fundamental reasons. 
First, in Canada and the European countries I mentioned, the death penalty 
was abolished by national legislatures that controlled unitary criminal justice 
systems. In the United States, the criminal justice system is fragmented. On this 
issue, it’s divided into fifty slices (or fifty-one, or fifty-three, depending on 
whether you count the District of Columbia and the territories). As a practical 
matter, Congress can’t abolish the death penalty.  
Second, and probably more important, in Canada and the European 
countries that abolished the death penalty, crime in general and the death penalty 
in particular were not significant electoral issues. Not then, and in most of them 
still not now. In America, crime has been an important electoral issue in local 
and state elections for a long time, at least 150 years. Crime became a national 
electoral issue in America starting in the late1960s, and before long the death 
penalty became an essential part of the politics of crime. That is a major focus 
of my talk today. 
A. Crime and Public Opinion 
Figure 2 is more complicated than Figure 1. It helps explain why and how 
public opinion came to influence our policy on capital punishment.  
FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: “% FAVOR DEATH PENALTY” is derived from opinion poll data stored in the iPoll Databank 
of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research [data on file with the author]; “HOMICIDE” and 
“VIOLENT CRIME” are derived from data on crime rates reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reports. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, https://ucr.fbi.gov/ [https://perma.cc/R48R-3EP4]. 
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The two lines at the bottom of Figure 2 track the rates of crime in the United 
States from 1960 through 2016 – violent crime in general, and homicide 
separately. They show that in the early 1960s the rate of violent crime was very 
low, near historic lows since these statistics have been available. But the 
homicide rate began to grow rapidly in the mid-1960s, and then kept going up. 
It reached a peak in the early 1970s and stayed high, with ups and downs, for 
twenty-some years. Violent crime in general followed a similar pattern but more 
slowly. It increased into the early 1990s.  
I mentioned that crime became a national political issue in the late 1960s. 
The turning point was Nixon’s campaign for president in 1968, when one of his 
major planks was a promise to restore “law and order.” In Barry Goldwater’s 
unsuccessful campaign for president in 1964, he talked about “crime in the 
streets”—but it didn’t catch on. In 1968 it did, in the context of the rising crime 
rates that we see in Figure 2. 
The type of crime that people were most concerned about in 1968 was 
politically driven: anti-war demonstrations that led to violence, and riots by 
African-Americans in major American cities, especially those that took place 
after the assassination of Martin Luther King in April of 1968. There was an 
unmistakable racial element to the campaign for law and order in 1968. That was 
intentional, as John Ehrlichman, one of Nixon’s closest advisors at the time, 
admitted some thirty years later. The focus on law and order was unambiguously 
a campaign against anti-war demonstrators and African-Americans. 
The top line in Figure 2 shows the percentage of people who support the 
death penalty, over time. In the early 1960s, support for the death penalty was 
quite low, hovering around fifty percent. That is how it appears on this chart, but 
we don’t know that much about public support for the death penalty back then. 
The line from 1960 to 1972 is jagged because, at that time, there were very few 
public opinion polls that asked questions about the death penalty. The few points 
that you see here are the only polls that we have from that time. In the 1980s and 
1990s there were maybe fifteen to twenty such polls each year. In the 1950s and 
early 1960s there was one poll one year, another poll two or three years later. 
That, as much as anything, reflects the status of the death penalty. It wasn’t a big 
issue. People didn’t think about it or talk about it much. 
Support for the death penalty started to go up in the early 1970s and kept 
going up until it reached a high plateau, in the range from seventy percent to 
seventy-six percent, from about 1982 to 1999. As you can see, the increase in 
support for the death penalty followed the rise in the crime rates, but with a time 
lag. It looks like it took several years for the effect of rising crime to take hold.  
B. The Supreme Court 
How do these public attitudes translate into law? In the fragmented 
American criminal justice system, any attempt to modify, limit, or ultimately 
repeal the death penalty is likely to focus on the one institution that has the power 
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to write legal rules that apply to murder prosecutions throughout the country—
the United States Supreme Court. So, the Supreme Court has been the main 
focus of most attempts to regulate and possibly repeal the death penalty.  
Furman v. Georgia, which I already mentioned, is the pivotal case. It came 
to the Court as a result of a several-year-long campaign by the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, which took on the issue because they kept 
running into racial discrimination in the use of the death penalty in the South. 
Legal Defense Fund lawyers and other lawyers working with them produced the 
moratorium on executions that was in place in the United States from 1967 until 
1977. 
How has the Supreme Court handled this challenge? Let me pause for 
another disclaimer. Here’s a major topic I am not going to talk about, except in 
the briefest passing: Supreme Court jurisprudence on the death penalty, starting 
with Furman. The death penalty litigators in the room know why not, and are 
giving me knowing smiles. They know that this body of law is basically 
indecipherable—which has become increasingly clear over forty-five years of 
trying to decipher it. In any event, this is not a talk about constitutional law. 
“Mr. Dooley” is a fictional bartender. He was created by a satirist named 
Finley Peter Dunne around the turn of the twentieth century. In 1901, the 
fictional Mr. Dooley said “th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.”2 This 
is taken as a criticism, because the Supreme Court, we are told, is not supposed 
to be guided by popular opinion. Remember what Chief Justice Roberts told the 
Senate at his confirmation hearing: Justices are umpires—they don’t make law, 
they just “call balls and strikes”3—and umpires are not supposed to listen to the 
crowd. 
Be that as it may, in this context the Supreme Court is supposed to pay 
attention to popular opinion, and ultimately to be governed by it. The main claim 
against the death penalty is that it violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishments, and the central issue in deciding whether a 
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment is its public acceptability.  
In 1958, the Supreme Court held that to decide whether a punishment is 
constitutional under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, the Court must 
decide whether it comports with “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”4 Nobody seriously disputes that rule. Even a 
committed originalist like the late Justice Scalia never argued that the Court 
should not look to popular opinion and other indications of public acceptability 
to decide whether a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Why 
 
 2. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901). 
 3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of 
the nominee, John G. Roberts). 
 4. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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not? Probably because in the late Eighteenth Century, when the Eighth 
Amendment was enacted, many brutal punishments that are considered 
intolerable today were widely used, including flogging, branding, and ear 
cropping.  
In any event, the Court has, to a great extent, followed popular opinion in its 
decisions on the death penalty, as we can see in Figure 2.  
When Furman was decided in 1972, support for the death penalty was on 
the way up, but that wasn’t yet clear. There were not many polls and support had 
been low for years. Crime and homicide had increased, but not to the levels that 
were seen ten years later. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, “kicked the can down the 
road”—sort of. It did two things.  
First, as I mentioned, they said that all existing death sentence laws were 
unconstitutional and that everybody sentenced under them could not be 
executed.  
Second, the Court implied that it was possible that better written and better 
implemented death-penalty laws might be constitutional under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause. That, in any event, is what Furman has been 
interpreted as saying. Furman is actually nine separate opinions, including five 
individual opinions by the five justices in the majority. It’s absolutely obscure.  
It’s a Rorschach test. It means whatever you think it means. But that’s how it 
has generally been taken.  
That’s where things stood until the next major case. Four years later, the 
Court decided Gregg v. Georgia5 – take two of “Is the Death Penalty an 
Unconstitutional Cruel and Unusual Punishment?” 
By then, in 1976, public support for the death penalty had clearly gone up 
from about 53% to something like 66%. Crime had also increased. The homicide 
rate was quite high. Violent crime was increasing and continued to increase for 
fifteen years.  
More important, in those four years, thirty-five states had enacted new death 
penalty laws to replace the ones that had been struck down in Furman. And at 
least 460 defendants had been sentenced to death under those new laws. The 
Court, correctly, took those facts as strong evidence that the death penalty was 
acceptable to a contemporary society in 1976. In a 7-2 decision, it held that the 
death penalty does not in itself violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment, and that it might be constitutional if it is appropriately 
structured and properly implemented. Indeed, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the post-Furman death-sentencing schemes in Georgia, 
Florida, and Texas—and by implication, in several other states as well. 
That second holding—that in order to be constitutional, the death penalty 
must be appropriately structured and implemented—was a huge qualification. It 
launched a period of constitutional regulation of the death penalty by the 
 
 5. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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Supreme Court that continues to this day, and—as far as anybody can tell—will 
go on for years to come. The Supreme Court hears and decides, on average, two 
or three death penalty cases a year. By now, there have been well over 100 
Supreme Court death penalty cases since Gregg, most of which were decided 
under the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Some of 
them go one way, some the other; some make sense, some make no sense at all. 
And there’s no end in sight. 
Initially, the basic message of Gregg seemed clear. States could go ahead, 
use their newly enacted death sentencing laws, and begin to execute people. 
Except that didn’t really happen for some time. 
As of June 1983, there had been only seven executions across the country in 
the seven years since Gregg, and four of them were executions of “volunteers,” 
defendants who gave up available appeals. That is to say, four of the seven were 
executed by their own choice while their cases were still under legal review. In 
other words, the Court’s decision in Gregg that the death penalty must be 
administered under tight controls had stalled the process to the point that there 
were almost no executions. The Supreme Court knew all of that. 
That issue came to a head in a series of decisions in 1983. In Zant v. 
Stephens6 and three other cases, the Court aggressively deregulated the death 
penalty. It removed a bunch of procedural protections that most people thought 
it had imposed in Gregg, and said, in effect, “That is not what we meant at all.” 
At the same time, the Court also expedited the process of federal court review 
of death sentences, federal habeas corpus review, in order to speed up 
executions.  
It worked. As we see on Figure 1, the rate of executions started going up in 
1983. In the second half of that year, after the decisions in Zant and the other 
cases, there were four more executions. None of them were volunteers. And the 
rate of executions kept going up until it reached heights we hadn’t seen since the 
1950s, and peaked at ninety-eight executions in 1999. 
  
 
 6. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
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C. The Death Penalty Triumphant 
The period from 1983 through 1999 was the heyday of the death penalty in 
the United States in the last 50 years.  
First, support for the death penalty was at an all-time high, as we see on 
Figure 1. By then pretty much everybody had a position on the death penalty 
and most of them were passionate. The death penalty had become a major 
political issue. There are many examples of this, but probably the best is the 
1988 presidential campaign in which George H.W. Bush defeated Michael 
Dukakis, the governor of Massachusetts.  
Crime was the leading issue in that campaign. Bush attacked Dukakis as soft 
on crime and focused heavily on a man named Willie Horton, as those of you 
who are old enough will remember well. (Actually, his name is William Horton, 
but he was called Willie by the Bush campaign and it stuck.) Horton, an African-
American who had been convicted of murder, was in prison in Massachusetts. 
He was released for a few days as part of a prison furlough program, and while 
on furlough, he robbed, raped, and assaulted white victims. Dukakis had nothing 
to do with the release, but it happened while Dukakis was governor. That 
incident became the most conspicuous issue in the campaign: Dukakis is soft on 
crime. Look at Willie Horton! And indeed, pictures of Willie Horton—looking 
very dark and very scary—were shown on television for months throughout the 
country. The racial content of the message was unmistakable.  
On election day in 1988, ABC News conducted an exit poll of voters. 
Twenty-seven percent of the respondents agreed that the candidate’s position on 
the death penalty was “very important” to them in choosing the president. To 
put that in perspective, that means that more voters cared deeply about Bush and 
Dukakis’s positions on the death penalty than about their positions on drugs, 
education, health care, or social security—or even the candidate’s political party. 
The only issue that ranked ahead of the death penalty was abortion, and only by 
a few points. 
By 1988, attitudes toward the death penalty had become an aspect of most 
Americans’ self-identification. It was a matter of choosing sides. “I’m for the 
death penalty; so is George Bush. Michael Dukakis is against the death penalty, 
so I’m against him.” 
Throughout this period, the Supreme Court continued to decide death 
penalty cases, and mostly they came out in favor of the prosecution. I mentioned 
that race was a major issue in attitudes toward the death penalty. It was a major 
issue in the Supreme Court as well. In 1987, the Court decided the case of 
McCleskey v. Kemp,7 in which they rejected an exceptionally well documented 
challenge to the use the death penalty in Georgia on the ground that defendants 
who were convicted of killing white victims were far more likely to be sentenced 
 
 7. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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to death than those convicted of killing black victims. The Supreme Court’s 
reaction? That may be true, but as far as the Constitution is concerned, it doesn’t 
matter. McCleskey is one of the most notorious decisions the Supreme Court has 
reached in the past seventy years. 
D. The Death Penalty in Retreat 
And then, after 1999, things started to change.  
By then, the homicide rate and the violent crime rate in general had been 
going down for years, since about 1993 or 1994, as we see on Figure 2. 
Homicides have kept going down. They are now at a level that we haven’t seen 
since the 1960s, and violent crime is down to levels we haven’t seen since the 
early 1970s. 
It took several years for that change to have an effect. It takes a while for 
people to notice and believe that crime isn’t as much of a problem as it used to 
be. But starting around 2000, support for the death penalty started to drop, and 
has continued to do so. It is now down around 58%, a level we have not seen 
since Furman.  
It’s not just the overall level of support. There was an even steeper drop in 
enthusiasm. The death penalty no longer commands the passion it once did. 
In 1994, a National Election Survey (an excellent public opinion poll) found 
that 76% of the respondents favored the death penalty. In 2015, another high 
quality poll by the Pew Research Center found that support had dropped to 57%, 
a decrease of 19%. But the 1994 survey also found that at that time 59%—a 
strong majority of all respondents—”strongly favored” the death penalty. In 
2015, strong support for the death penalty was down to 23%, a drop of 36%. In 
2015 strong supporters were a minority even among those who favor capital 
punishment. 
The use of the death penalty followed suit. In Figure 1, you see that the 
number of executions went down from ninety-eight in 1999 to twenty in 2016, 
an 80% drop. In 2006, twelve states had abolished the death penalty; that number 
is now up to nineteen states, plus the District of Columbia. Four additional states 
have moratoria against executions in effect, and in another twelve states where 
the death penalty is available in theory, nobody has been executed in at least five 
years. In other words, only fifteen states—fewer than half of those that have the 
death penalty on the books—have actually used it in the last five years. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Death Sentences By Year, Death Penalty Info. Ctr (2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
death-sentences-year-1977-present [https://perma.cc/G5HN-2AY]. 
New death sentences have gone down even more quickly. See Figure 3. 
They just dropped off the table. The number of death sentences imposed 
decreased by about half from 1998 to 2001, and by 90% from the 1990s—when 
there were over 300 in some years—to 2016, when there were thirty-one. 
Over a relatively short period, the death penalty has moved from center stage 
to the periphery. It is now far less common in every respect: less widely 
available, rarely imposed, infrequently carried out, less popular, and less 
passionately supported. And this has happened across the board, including in 
those states that executed the most prisoners less than twenty years ago. 
In Texas, which has conducted more executions since 1976 than the next six 
states combined, the number of new death sentences went from forty-eight in 
1999 to two in 2015. Two. In Virginia, which has had the second largest number 
of executions since 1976, there have been no new death sentences in the last five 
years. Zero.  
And here in Missouri, through most of the 1980s and 1990s, you had half a 
dozen death sentences a year or more. But there have been only four new death 
sentences in Missouri since 2010, and none at all in the last three years.  
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II.  WHY IS THE DEATH PENALTY IN DECLINE? 
Why did all this happen? I don’t know for sure, but here are some thoughts. 
A. Crime and Politics 
First, there’s the drop in crime itself, once people noticed it and believed it. 
That explanation seems obvious, but it requires a bit of discussion. The 
relationship between crime, and the fear of crime, and support for the death 
penalty, is not necessarily symmetrical in good times and bad. If crime goes up, 
if murder is rampant, many people conclude that we need a death penalty to 
protect ourselves. If crime goes down, however, they might not switch to “We 
don’t need the death penalty,” but rather think “It seems to be working. Let’s 
leave it in place.” 
More important, when crime goes down, many people just stop paying 
attention to the death penalty, or to crime and punishment generally—and lack 
of attention doesn’t motivate anybody to do anything. If there’s no crisis, an 
existing practice can just stay in place. The fact that crime has gone way down 
and homicide is much less common may mean that there is no affirmative push 
to increase the use of the death penalty, but it does not, on its own, create 
pressure to eliminate capital punishment or even reduce its use. That requires 
something else in addition.  
Second, at least at the national level, crime has largely dropped out of 
politics since 2000—or had, until 2016. That change, of course, was driven by 
the steep decrease in crime rates; crime just isn’t on people’s minds nearly as 
much as it was twenty-five years ago. Crime was barely an issue in George W. 
Bush’s presidential campaign against Al Gore in 2000. It didn’t surface at all 
when Bush defeated John Kerry in 2004, or in either of Barack Obama’s 
successful campaigns, in the 2008 and 2012 elections. It was basically never 
mentioned.  
Does anybody even remember John Kerry’s position on the death penalty? 
Or for that matter, President Obama’s position on the death penalty? He had 
one—he was “troubled” by its use in America but was not opposed to executions 
in principle—but hardly anybody knew that. It never came up. And it wasn’t just 
the death penalty. Crime in general just wasn’t discussed in those elections. In 
exit polls, asking those who had just voted what they cared about when choosing 
the president, crime was never mentioned. 
As I said, a major reason for this was the huge drop in crime rates. In 
addition, we owe a peculiar debt to Bill Clinton, who is hardly my favorite 
president on criminal justice policy.  
Clinton became president when crime was a red-hot issue. He made it a 
matter of policy not to be outflanked on the right in his support for draconian 
punishments, and especially his support for the death penalty. He wasn’t. In 
1991, he interrupted his election campaign to return to Arkansas to preside over 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
774 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:763 
the execution of a brain damaged defendant. In 1994, he expanded the number 
of federal capital crimes from one to sixty—most of which are not used for 
anything but getting elected.  
Bill Clinton made sure that nobody mistook him for Michael Dukakis. One 
effect was to make it impossible to think of support for punitive criminal 
measures in general, and for the death penalty in particular, as a uniquely 
Republican position, since the most effective proponent for harsh punishment 
and the death penalty was the Democratic president. By the end of Clinton’s 
tenure, crime and punishment—and the death penalty in particular—was not an 
issue that divided Democrats from Republicans the way it once had. As a result, 
when the effects of the decline in crime began to take hold, some Republicans 
could come out in favor of more reasonable, less punitive policies in ways that 
weren’t politically possible ten years earlier.  
B. DNA and Death-Row Exonerations 
Changes in crime rates and politics made it possible for use and support for 
the death penalty to drop, but not inevitable. Actual change required a few 
additional factors.  
First, there was a new reason to oppose executions. There have always been 
strong reasons to oppose the death penalty. I mentioned some of them before; 
it’s very costly, it’s plagued by racial discrimination, it’s arbitrary—and it 
produces no benefits. In particular, there is no indication that executions deter 
murders. (By the way, these days most Americans who support the death penalty 
don’t think it deters homicide. That used to be the most common reason why 
people supported the death penalty. It’s now a minority position even among 
those who do support the death penalty.)  
All of those reasons, and especially the fact that executions don’t deter 
murder, had been around since well before 1972. It’s much easier for people to 
change their minds about a policy if they have a new reason to do so. Something 
they didn’t think about before. Ideally, something that is supported by a new 
type of evidence, especially new scientific evidence—like DNA.  
DNA identification technology was first used to establish the innocence of 
convicted defendants in the United States in 1989. It can conclusively prove that 
defendants are innocent years after they were convicted, including in cases 
where nobody doubted their guilt. We now know of more than 350 DNA 
exonerations. Between 1973 and 1999, eighty-two people who had been 
sentenced to death were exonerated and freed—not resentenced to life 
imprisonment, but cleared of all charges and released from prison.  
That bulge in death-row exonerations had a major impact precisely because 
it was not anticipated. It was new and it was based on science—the sort of thing 
we should take into account now because we didn’t know about it before. There 
are multiple Supreme Court opinions that say just that.  
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There’s a bit of a problem, however, with that description of the issue. In 
fact, very few death-row exonerations have anything to do with DNA. DNA 
exonerations occur mostly in sexual assault cases because rapists usually leave 
semen at the crime scene and it can be tested for DNA. Most murders don’t have 
that sort of biological evidence. As a result, only 12% of death row exonerations 
involve DNA evidence. 
But exonerations of defendants on death row and DNA exonerations hit 
televisions screens at about the same time, so people generally thought they were 
the same thing. Many, probably most, still do. 
C. Death Penalty Attitudes Are Largely Symbolic 
Second, and at least equally important, attitudes toward the death penalty 
are symbolic. What do I mean by that?  
The death penalty is hardly the only aspect of the vast increase in punitive 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Mass incarceration is the truly massive problem 
that these policies generated. It affects millions of people. There have been some 
changes in our policies on imprisonment since the sharp decrease in crime began 
twenty-some years ago—the “smart on crime movement,” drug courts, changes 
in sentencing rules. And there has been a decrease in the number of people we 
imprison, but only by a few percent. There has been nothing like the massive 
change we have seen that use the death penalty, at least not so far.  
That is to be expected. Incarceration is a huge industry: more than one-and-
a-half million people in prisons and about 750,000 in local jails across the 
country. That’s a lot of people. It affects lots of jobs, and has many other 
implications. It’s a huge ship; it’ll take a lot of time to turn it around.  
On the other hand, the death penalty could be eliminated overnight and 
nothing else would change. It’s a policy that has concrete implications for almost 
nobody in the country. Even fifty executions a year—a rate which we have not 
seen for some time—is less than one execution for every six million people. 
Virtually nobody has personal contact with any aspect of the death penalty. 
Murder is a terrible crime, but a very uncommon one. Less than 1% of felony 
convictions in the United States are murder convictions, and maybe 1/100 of 1% 
of felony convictions are death sentences. That’s a tiny number. 
The death penalty may have great importance, but primarily as a symbol. I 
suspect that at the height of support for the death penalty, even the most 
committed anti-crime warriors knew that the death penalty was not so much a 
weapon against crime as a flag to rally behind. 
It’s much easier to change an occasional and largely symbolic practice than 
a vast institution like mass incarceration. Under the right circumstances, that sort 
of change can be rapid. 
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D. Criminal Defense and Political Action 
I should mention two other factors that influenced the speed as well as the 
direction of this change. 
First, increasingly good, and increasingly well-organized capital defense 
work has made a big difference by reducing the number of death sentences. It 
has become more difficult, more expensive, and less likely for prosecutors to get 
death sentences. Some of the other panelists that we are honored to have here 
will talk about that later today. 
Second, I mentioned that seven states have abolished the death penalty since 
2006. That didn’t happen by chance. Those decisions were the result of well-
organized political campaigns that have increasingly focused on mobilizing 
conservatives who oppose the death penalty. 
E. What’s Next? 
So, what happens next? As before, the focus is on the Supreme Court. 
The Court has kept on deciding cases on the death penalty since its use and 
support began to decline, starting around 1999. In general, their decisions have 
been less friendly to the death penalty than before. The last Supreme Court 
opinion I’ll mention is a dissent in June 2015 in the case of Glossip v. Gross.8 
In that dissent, Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Ginsburg, 
invites a plenary reexamination of the constitutional status of the death penalty. 
Breyer discusses many of the issues we’ve covered, focusing especially on the 
large number of exonerations of defendants sentenced to death and the 
accumulating evidence that we not only sentence innocent people to death, but 
also execute some of them. He concludes that it’s now time, thirty-nine years 
after Gregg, to reexamine that decision and reconsider the constitutionality of 
capital punishment.  
The Glossip dissent was widely interpreted as speaking for justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan as well as Breyer and Ginsburg. If that’s true, and if 
Justice Anthony Kennedy also went along, that would be five justices—enough 
to abolish the death penalty—and Justice Kennedy had voted to limit the use of 
the death penalty in several other cases in recent years.  
For more than a year, the Glossip dissent generated excitement among many 
people who oppose the death penalty. Support for the death penalty was way 
down, its use was dropping like a stone, and now Justice Breyer had said, in 
effect, “Please—ask us to revisit Gregg. It’s time for the Court to hear a case 
that we could use to decide that the death penalty is unconstitutional.”  
By now, nobody thinks it’s going to happen any time soon. That moment 
has passed. We now have Justice Neil Gorsuch, who is highly unlikely to vote 
to outlaw the death penalty. More important, we have President Donald Trump.  
 
 8. 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015). 
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Trump may have a chance to appoint additional justices in the next few 
years. But even if the composition of the Court does not change, I don’t see any 
justice voluntarily taking on an issue that would be as politically controversial 
as the abolition of capital punishment. The justices know that at any time they 
might face a constitutional crisis in which they have to confront the President 
over the power to wage war, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, 
encroachments on the First Amendment, or who knows what Trump might do 
in the next three years. If I were in their shoes, I’d keep my powder dry for a 
potential fight about the very structure of the Republic. 
Also, for what it’s worth, I never thought the Supreme Court was going to 
take on the constitutionality of the death penalty any time soon. I didn’t think it 
was going to happen a year ago, when I had little doubt that Trump would never 
get elected—so obviously I’m not much of a prophet. But the reason wasn’t 
Trump, or the things he was saying. It was terrorism.  
Americans support the death penalty for terrorists more than they support 
the death penalty in principle. We have seen this repeatedly in opinion polls. 
When asked in 2001 if they support the death penalty, 62% said yes—but 75% 
said that Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma federal building bomber, should be 
executed. The same thing happened again in 2015, in polls about Dzhokhar 
Tsarnayev, the Boston Marathon bomber. 
There have been several terrorist attacks in the United States in the last few 
years. They could get worse, as everyone knows. In July 2016, a terrorist in a 
truck killed eighty-six people and injured more than 450 in Nice, France. The 
same, or worse, could happen any time in Miami Beach or in Portland. If the 
Supreme Court chose to abolish the death penalty, it would make that decision 
in March or April of, say, 2019, and then issue an opinion abolishing the death 
penalty in late June of that year—knowing all along that in May or in July there 
might be a terrorist attack of that magnitude somewhere in America. I can’t 
imagine the Court doing that. 
III.  THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 
So, what will happen to the death penalty under President Trump?  
Opposition to the death penalty seems to thrive when it’s not a hot issue. 
When it’s been neglected. When it’s almost forgotten. That’s where we were in 
1972. We were getting back somewhere close to that position a few years ago.  
In 2012, there was a referendum in California on repealing the death penalty. 
It didn’t pass, but it came close—it got 48% of the votes. In talking to voters in 
that campaign, the organizers of the repeal effort discovered that lots of 
Californians didn’t even know that California had the death penalty. Which isn’t 
really surprising. Nobody had been executed in California for 13 years, and there 
were lots of other pressing issues on people’s minds.  
Passion seems to favor people who argue for the death penalty. Passion for 
justice and for revenge against vicious criminals, passion to protect innocent 
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victims. On the other side, most of the reasons to oppose the death penalty are 
more bland and abstract: It costs too much. It doesn’t work effectively. It 
discriminates between some killers and other killers based on race.  
Punishing the innocent can generate passion. The prospect of executing an 
innocent person has been the most effective issue in mobilizing opposition to the 
death penalty. It might have a huge impact if it were ever demonstrated 
conclusively that a person who was put to death recently was totally innocent. 
That has not happened.  
But it’s easy to mobilize passion on the other side simply by telling the 
horrific stories of many murders. These terrible, heart-wrenching stories are not 
likely to change the minds of those who oppose the death penalty. But they can 
mobilize many of those who already support the death penalty but are not 
particularly concerned about it, and others who had not thought about the issue 
at all. That’s more than enough to keep an existing institution in place. 
There was a second anti-death penalty referendum in California, in 2016. It 
did worse than the one in 2012. It only got 46% of the vote. Why? In 2012 there 
had been no organized opposition to the anti-death penalty referendum. In 2016 
there was another death penalty referendum on the same ballot, sponsored by 
several district attorneys, a proposal that was designed to speed up the process 
of carrying out executions.  
In other words, in 2016 there was an active electoral campaign for and 
against the death penalty in California, with spending and media coverage on 
both sides. Those in favor of the death penalty carried the day. Their own 
proposal got 51% of the vote, and the campaign they waged also reduced support 
for the proposal to abolish the death penalty from its 2012 level, despite the fact 
that in the intervening four years the California electorate had become younger 
and more heavily Democratic, and included a higher proportion of minorities. 
These demographic changes should have favored opponents of the death 
penalty, but with concerted opposition from those who favor the death penalty, 
it wasn’t close anymore. 
We know Trump’s position on the death penalty. He has not talked about it 
much recently, but it’s no secret. Trump devotes more time to torture and 
brutality, both of which he advocates. Last July he told police officers, “When 
you see these towns and when you see these thugs being thrown into the back of 
a paddy wagon, you just see them thrown in, rough, and I said, ‘Please don’t be 
too nice,’” and “Like when you guys put somebody in the car and you’re 
protecting their head, you know, the way you put their hand over [so they] don’t 
hit their head. I said, you can take the hand away, okay?”9 This is the President 
of the United States, on national television, advocating extra-legal violence by 
 
 9. Maya Rhodan, President Trump Tells Police Officers Not to Be ‘Too Nice’ With Suspects, 
TIME (July 28, 2017), http://time.com/4878838/president-donald-trump-police-officers/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y2VQ-X5X4]. 
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police. The same president who, in his inaugural address, railed about “this 
American carnage” at a time when crime rates are lower than they’ve been in 
decades.  
As long as Trump is President, abolition of the death penalty is a 
nonstarter—not because support has increased, but because passions of those 
who do support it can easily be stirred up by the President, and will be if the 
issue ever makes it onto Fox News. 
This will pass. Maybe in three years, maybe in ten, but it will pass. In the 
meantime, I believe the death penalty will continue to be used in America, but 
in the greatly diminished form that we’ve seen for the last ten years. The work 
that some of the other panelists are doing, and the trends that they will describe 
later today, will keep the death penalty in retreat and help maintain opposition 
in these grim times.  
The tide will change within the lifetime of most if not all of us in this room. 
When that happens, you will finally see this nasty, destructive, and inhumane 
practice bite the dust. 
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